Crisis Committees

For the Yale MUN Conference this past weekend, I was crisis manager for the United States National Security Council.

For those who are unfamiliar, crisis committees differ from normal committees. Most committees are simulations of United Nations organs, such as the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council, where students represent different countries and debate United Nations policy on international topics (hence "Model" UN). By contrast, crisis committees do not simply discuss topics, but also "crises," which are pressing events manufactured by the conference staff that require the immediate attention of the committee. Some crisis committees also simulate UN organs, such as the Security Council, but many also simulate high-level cabinets and other political bodies that not only set policy but can take immediate action.

For example, this past weekend I ran a simulation of the US National Security Council (NSC). Students in my committee did not represent countries, but people. One roleplayed Vice President Cheney, another was the NSC's Senior Advisor on Iraq and Afghanistan, and someone even acted as Karl Rove. The students initially discussed the topics of the committee, which were "Reorganizing the NSC" and "Iran." Soon, however, they debated what to do in response to various crisis situations, namely a suicide bombing in Israel and a dirty bomb in the United States. As crisis manager, I devised and informed the committee of these crises. Although technically the NSC is an advisory body to the President on policies of national security and does not act immediately in crisis situations, my simulation also incorporated the White House Situation Room, in which members of the NSC advise the President on immediate actions.

A good crisis is not only exciting but realistic. So, nuclear weapons suddenly appearing in Mozambique might be interesting but doubtful. In contrast, it might not be in Iran's interest to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but given what's happened over the past few years, it's not entirely implausible. In addition, a good crisis is exciting for everyone present. If the crisis is about US response to the outbreak of war in Kashmir, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development plays almost no role, and that delegate will be bored out of his mind. What also makes a crisis exciting is that it responds to the committee and makes delegates feel like their actions are making a difference.

Moreover, a good crisis is actionable, meaning the committee can actually do something about the topic and has a number of possible responses. So a famine in China is probably a bad crisis in the UN Security Council because A) China has veto power and will respond--or not--to crises within its own borders as it sees fit and B) even if China allowed the UNSC to respond, the only plausible thing to do is getting food to China, which may not even be within its mandate nor is it a topic of "international peace and security" requiring the Council's attention.

The point of a Model UN crisis is not to present some ridiculous situation, but to probe our understanding of the issue at hand by exploring various scenarios. There's probably nothing more intellectually satisfying in MUN than working with your fellow delegates to defuse a good crisis. Once you've done your fair share of GA and ECOSOC committees, topics begin looking the same: you want to do something; no one can do anything; so everyone blames the United States. Crisis committees, however, differ vastly from conference to conference, which makes them refreshing and fun. Nothing in MUN is worse, however, than a terrible crisis that's boring, unrealistic, poorly-planned, excludes delegates, leaves no options, and is unresponsive.

A good crisis requires a good crisis manager. Some make up the crisis as it goes along, coming up with one or two ideas before the conference, seeing how delegates respond, and then giving the next update. Others create elaborate crisis "trees" ahead of time, brainstorming different situations, determining possible responses to them, and outlining the consequences, game theory-style. Some are hardcore MUN delegates themselves who know how to push and pull the committee, giving them direction but options, too, and letting the delegates shape the crisis and, consequently, their experience. Others are woefully inexperienced who think they can come up with one idea ahead of time and expect the committee to act a certain way; when the committee does not, then such crisis managers are screwed.

I've seen good and bad crises as both delegate and crisis manager, usually the UN Security Council. I understand that designing good crises is a difficult task; it's more complicated than people think. Different crisis managers from different conferences and different schools all have different ideas how crises ought to be run. I'd like to share those ideas so that we can learn best practices and improve our committees.

My next post will present a crisis management "framework," using my committee this past weekend as an example. This framework comprises the "parts" of a crisis that I used to outline it beforehand and help me respond to delegate actions during the conference. It's not fool-proof; it's a work in progress. But it's what I can offer as a first step towards sharing best practices and, in a larger sense, further realizing an MUN community.